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Foreword 
Since its establishment 11 years ago, a considerable amount of CAEPR’s research 
attention has focused on such core themes as the impact of the welfare on 
Indigenous people, Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) 
schemes, economic development, governance structures and self-determination, 
and alcohol issues. These are amongst the matters addressed by Noel Pearson in 
his recent monograph Our Right the Take Responsibility, as well as in others of his 
publications and speeches. 
CAEPR has found Pearson’s ideas stimulating and challenging for its research 
agenda, particularly in the wider context of current proposals for reform of the 
welfare system, such as those contained in the McClure Report. There have been 
a number of CAEPR seminars, informal discussions, and in-house articles, which 
have been developed in response to Noel Pearson’s ideas. 
One of CAEPR’s great strengths is that it is a multidisciplinary institution which 
draws in its policy analyses on the frameworks offered by economics and 
economic anthropology, political science, history, demography, and social 
anthropology. This Discussion Paper has been written by David Martin, a social 
anthropologist with many years of experience living and working in Cape York 
Peninsula, the region on which Noel Pearson’s proposals focus. It evaluates 
certain core underpinning assumptions in Pearson’s proposals, utilising the 
insights offered through anthropological understandings of remote Aboriginal 
societies. 
The paper is supportive of the broad thrust of Pearson’s ideas. However, on the 
basis of ethnographic evidence, it does raise issues about whether Aboriginal 
‘families’ and ‘communities’ have the capacity to both demand and implement 
mutual obligation (‘reciprocity’) in the manner which Pearson proposes. The paper 
argues that the key to Pearson’s reform agenda lies in the new institutional and 
governance arrangements which must be devised. However, it argues further that 
given the fractured nature of the contemporary Indigenous polity, the 
development and ongoing operation of these new institutional arrangements will 
require partnerships between Aboriginal people and government, and that such 
involvement by government will inevitably entail risks for Aboriginal people. 
Noel Pearson has made a significant contribution to a debate of national 
importance. It is to be hoped that this Discussion Paper is seen as a sympathetic 
contribution to this debate. 
Professor Jon Altman 
Director, CAEPR 
April 2001 
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Summary 
Aboriginal lawyer, activist and social commentator Noel Pearson has recently 
argued that the current mode of delivery of welfare services to Aboriginal people is 
deeply antithetical to their interests and wellbeing. Central to his scheme for 
policy change and improved welfare outcomes are two core propositions. The first 
is that the ‘passive welfare’ policies instituted in Aboriginal communities over the 
past three decades, with no demands for reciprocity and responsibility on the part 
of welfare recipients, have promoted detrimental relations of passivity and 
dependence which are now deeply embedded within Aboriginal societies. 
Pearson’s second key proposition is that addressing the dysfunctional 
consequences of the welfare system for Aboriginal people will require structural 
change. In particular, new institutions for Aboriginal governance, both formal and 
informal, will need to be developed. It is through reform of the existing 
institutional arrangements between government and Aboriginal communities, and 
through these formal and informal Aboriginal institutions, Pearson argues, that 
the principles of reciprocity and individual responsibility necessary to leach the 
‘poison’ from welfare resources can be instituted and implemented. 
Pearson’s arguments should be seen as a welcome and politically innovative 
contribution to a policy debate of fundamental importance. The status quo in 
welfare policy, at least for remote Aboriginal Australia, is not sustainable. 
However, on the basis of ethnographic evidence from Cape York and other north 
Queensland Aboriginal communities—the region on which Pearson’s policy 
proposals are centred—this Discussion Paper suggests that certain of Pearson’s 
underlying assumptions need careful re-examination and further development, 
and that the evidence poses certain difficulties for the practical implementation of 
his proposals. 
In particular, the ethnography from Cape York and elsewhere suggests that 
certain widespread Aboriginal values and practices may be inimical to the kinds 
of social and attitudinal changes which Pearson is advocating and, further, that 
these values and practices have not simply arisen as the consequence of the 
experience of colonialism or the introduction of welfare. This then raises the 
question of the sources of the moral suasion and authority necessary to demand 
and implement social change in Aboriginal societies. Pearson proposes that these 
lie variously within ‘families’ and other local groups and ‘communities’. This view 
is challenged here, with the argument that such contemporary groupings do not 
have the requisite moral and political authority over individuals. If this is the 
case, it creates a dilemma for Pearson’s scheme, for if social and attitudinal 
changes are necessary, whence can they be driven? 
The answer may lie in the new forms of Indigenous governance and leadership 
which Pearson proposes. However, these would involve significant changes within 
the Indigenous polity, which may be beyond the capacity of Indigenous groups 
themselves to institute. Facilitation and support from external sources, including 
viii MARTIN 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
government, may be required. However, the involvement of government in social 
change would carry its own risks, since despite rhetorical support for Indigenous 
self-determination, government is inherently incapable of moving beyond its own 
dominating rationale. 
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Introduction 
This Discussion Paper has been stimulated by the speeches and writings of 
Aboriginal activist lawyer and social commentator Noel Pearson, most particularly 
by his ideas as expressed in his recently published monograph Our Right to Take 
Responsibility (Pearson 2000b), in his Chifley Memorial Lecture, ‘The light on the 
hill’ (Pearson 2000d), and in a chapter in a volume on reforming the Australian 
welfare system (Pearson 2000c). However, this paper does not attempt to present 
a definitive response to the complex set of inter-related Indigenous cultural, 
political and welfare policy issues raised with such eloquence and passion by 
Pearson. Rather, its aim is to examine particular concepts which, it is suggested, 
lie at the heart of Pearson’s arguments, through an anthropological framework 
based on ethnographic understandings of Aboriginal societies and their 
interactions with the welfare system. 
Pearson argues that the current mode of delivery of welfare services to Aboriginal 
people is ultimately deeply antithetical to their interests and wellbeing. Central to 
his scheme for policy change and improved welfare outcomes are certain core 
propositions. The first of relevance to this discussion is that the welfare policies 
instituted over the past three decades have produced a ‘gammon’ (artificial) 
welfare economy within Aboriginal societies which contrasts with the ‘real’ 
economies of both traditional Aboriginal subsistence and the market economy. It 
is the absence of reciprocity between recipients of services and those providing 
them which renders the welfare economy ‘gammon’, in Pearson’s view. This 
‘passive welfare’ policy and system of service delivery invariably promotes 
detrimental relations of passivity and dependence which are now deeply 
embedded within Aboriginal society and culture (Pearson 2000b: 26–39). 
Pearson’s second key proposition is that meaningful change to address the 
dysfunctional consequences of the welfare system for Aboriginal people will 
require structural change, in particular the development of new institutions for 
Aboriginal governance, both formal and informal. It will also require the reform of 
existing institutional arrangements for dealing with the resources provided 
through the welfare system, including those arrangements which come under the 
aegis of the State. Genuine partnerships between government and these 
Aboriginal institutions must replace the current mechanisms which are controlled 
by government. It is through reform of the existing institutional arrangements, 
and through these formal and informal Aboriginal institutions, Pearson argues, 
that the reciprocity and individual responsibility necessary to transform the 
‘gammon’ welfare economy to a ‘real’ economy can be developed (Pearson 2000b: 
67–82). 
This paper is broadly supportive of the thrust of Pearson’s arguments, which 
should be seen as a welcome and politically innovative contribution to a policy 
debate of fundamental importance. Pearson is unquestionably correct in his view 
that it is simply not sustainable to maintain the current status quo in welfare 
policy, at least for remote Aboriginal Australia. However, it is suggested that on 
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the basis of ethnographic evidence from Cape York and other north Queensland 
Aboriginal communities—the region on which Pearson’s policy proposals are 
centred—certain of his underlying assumptions need careful re-examination and 
further explication, and pose real difficulties for the practical implementation of 
his proposals. 
Pearson’s arguments: A brief outline 
In a series of articles and speeches (e.g. Pearson 1999a, 1999b, 2000d, 2000a), 
and more recently in a monograph and a book chapter (Pearson 2000b, 2000c), 
Noel Pearson has argued that engagement with the welfare state over the past 
three decades has corrupted traditional Aboriginal values to the extent that 
Aboriginal societies have been ‘poisoned’ by the relationship. 
While Pearson’s metaphor of ‘poison’ relates to the leaching of toxins from the 
cycad palm nut to render it edible (Pearson 2000b: 55), it is also evocative of the 
strategies of those nineteenth-century settlers who laced with poison the flour 
they supplied to hungry Aboriginal people. Ironically, welfare money comes to 
Aboriginal recipients both as the practical symbol of their citizenship status and 
entitlements, and as the tangible means of ensuring sustenance to the needy. 
Metaphorically, welfare is thus the new form of ‘tucker,’ but in Pearson’s view its 
provision has entailed the unintended consequence of poisoning Aboriginal 
society through a debilitating dependency. Speaking of welfare dependent 
Australians more generally, Pearson states: 
Today we routinely see third and fourth generations dependent upon income 
assistance through the social security system. These people are trapped in the 
welfare safety net. Welfare dependency for these people is not a temporary 
halfway house. It has become a permanent address (1999a: 31). 
This situation is exacerbated for Aboriginal people by a particular set of historical, 
social, and locational factors, including racially based discrimination and 
exclusion. Many aspects of Pearson’s thinking on how to change current welfare 
policies and program administration flow from arguments by Mark Latham (1997) 
that advantage and disparity are linked to location (Pearson 1999b). In 
constructing his argument and driving home his analogy of welfare as poison, 
Pearson focuses on what he portrays as the limited responsibility many Aboriginal 
people in Cape York communities take for themselves and others. He argues that 
traditional principles of sharing and reciprocity have become ‘corrupted’ in the 
Cape York communities as a consequence of welfare policies and service delivery; 
for example, in demands to share welfare incomes to purchase alcohol (2000b: 
18–19). Pearson concludes that fundamentally, welfare dependency has become a 
pervasive component of contemporary Aboriginal values—a mentality—and has 
poisoned people’s capacity to assume responsibility for themselves and their 
fellows (2000b: 30–2). This dependency has inevitably locked people out of 
participating in a ‘real economy’, either the ‘real’ market economy or the ‘real’ 
economy of traditional society. Common to both forms of economy, Pearson 
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argues, is the demand for social and economic reciprocity (1999a: 32, 2000b: 
26-8). 
Pearson accepts that Aboriginal people in remote regions such as Cape York will 
continue to be, in part at least, dependent upon government transfer payments in 
some form. What is needed therefore is the transformation of the resources 
provided by Government from socially corruptive ‘negative welfare’, which 
encourages dependency, into ‘positive resources’, based on reciprocity (2000b: 
53–4). 
At one level, many of Pearson’s arguments are far from novel. Locational 
disadvantage, for example, has long been recognised as a fundamental limitation 
on service delivery generally, and as an identified obstacle to enterprise 
development and the achievement of economic independence for people—
including Aboriginal people—in rural and remote areas (see Altman 1990; Taylor 
1993, 2000). The detrimental consequences of welfare dependency have been 
recognised by Indigenous people themselves (Macdonald 2000b: 107), and widely 
observed and critiqued across both the Indigenous sector and the broader 
Australian society, from a variety of policy and political perspectives (see 
contributions in Saunders 2000). For example, studies have documented the 
effects of intergenerational welfare dependence associated with long-term 
unemployment (see discussions in McCoull & Pech 2000; and Saunders & Stone 
2000). Researchers have similarly considered the effects of unemployment 
benefits, or ‘sit down money’ on skilled Aboriginal pastoral workers in rural and 
remote Australia, following changes in the pastoral industry and its labour 
market (May 1994). Martin (1993b) has documented in considerable detail the 
impact of the welfare-based cash economy on an Aboriginal community in Cape 
York, in terms which have a strong resonance with certain of Pearson’s key 
themes. 
Pearson refers to none of these works, nor to other relevant academic and policy 
literature in his arguments. However, he should not be criticised for this 
omission, for this would be to miss the fact that his is an essentially political 
argument, which has been carefully crafted to resonate with current political and 
policy concerns in the wider welfare sector. It is in this crafting that one 
important dimension of Pearson’s innovation lies.1 
A further, and highly significant, innovation is that Pearson explicitly rejects 
arguments that the current parlous state of Cape York’s Aboriginal population 
can be solely attributed to the cumulative effects of the racism, dispossession, 
and trauma to which its communities have been exposed. While these may 
provide the ultimate explanation for the current situation, in Pearson’s view they 
cannot explain the rapid social breakdown in these communities over the last 
three decades of the twentieth century. This Pearson attributes to the artificial 
economies of these remote communities and the corrupting nature of passive 
welfare (Pearson 2000b: 29–39). Changing the situation will require partnerships 
between Aboriginal people, who must take responsibility for change, and 
government. Pearson thus directly, and courageously, confronts a pervasive 
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theme in contemporary Aboriginal political discourse, which places the causes of 
current problems firmly within the history of colonisation, and establishes 
Aboriginal people as its powerless victims. 
Pearson’s arguments about Indigenous welfare policy resonate with those current 
in wider welfare policy debates. Thus, the Federal government has sought to 
address long-term welfare dependency by progressively instituting a range of 
policies under the rubric of ‘mutual obligation’. Before receiving unemployment 
benefits, all job seekers are now required to sign a Preparing for Work Agreement, 
which describes the assistance to be provided by Centrelink and other agencies, 
and details the activities job seekers must undertake in order to continue to 
receive benefits.2 For certain categories of welfare recipients, this involves 
participation in programs ranging from training to ‘Work for the Dole’ as a 
reciprocal social duty.3 These programs are aimed at reducing the economic and 
social costs of long-term dependency on state benefits, by seeking to prepare 
people for entry to the wider labour market, by ensuring that their capacity to be 
‘job ready’ is not lost, and by developing training as a specific component of job-
seeking activity. The relationship between ‘mutual obligation’ and Pearson’s 
concept of ‘reciprocity’ will be examined later in this paper. 
Pearson is not averse to government involvement in itself. In fact, he argues that 
it is imperative for government to provide the resources on which, in the absence 
of economic self-reliance through the market economy, Aboriginal people must 
depend. However, he argues for a fundamental restructuring of the means 
through which these resources are provided. He proposes a form of self 
determination which would re-allocate responsibility for policy formulation and 
service delivery from government alone to government and community 
partnerships. This shift would redefine the role of the state ‘from a disabler to an 
enabler’ (1999a: 33, see also 2000b: 53–4).  
Pearson argues further that current service delivery has proved problematic on 
the ground. Although government has considerable resources to commit to 
welfare programs, its modus operandi lacks coordination, encourages overlap and 
duplication, and is not based on holistic strategies. For example, in Cape York at 
least 15 different health programs, 200 education programs, and numerous 
economic development schemes are simultaneously administered (Pearson 1999a: 
33). Of course, research has for some time been providing arguments to support a 
whole-of-government streamlined management of programs to Cape York 
communities and elsewhere; see for example studies relevant to Cape York by 
Dale (1992), Finlayson and Dale (1996), and Martin (1990). Yet, Pearson argues, 
merely attempting to address the manifest problems in the Cape York Aboriginal 
communities through better coordination of programs and other adjustments 
suffers from the same basic limitations: it assumes that welfare-induced problems 
can be solved through more effective program delivery under policies which are 
often developed in a cocoon of bureaucratic isolation. From this perspective, 
government has itself become a reproductive source of the negative welfare 
mentality (Pearson 2000b: 40–3). 
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A core aspect of Pearson’s proposed welfare changes is new Aboriginal governance 
institutions, both formal and informal. In particular, he proposes a new statutory 
interface between Cape York Aboriginal peoples and government to coordinate 
holistic policy development, planning, and the administration and delivery of 
welfare programs at regional, sub-regional and local levels. This ‘partnership 
interface’ would be crucial to the process of ‘leaching out the poison from the 
resources of welfare’ (2000b: 70). He suggests that: 
[t]he interface needs to become the meeting place between the State and the 
Cape York community and its leaders, and all government programs and 
inputs into Cape York need to be through this interface. The State would 
negotiate with Aboriginal community representatives at this interface about 
the design of programs and the development of cooperative agreements on 
how the programs will be delivered on the ground (1999a: 33). 
This interface would be the place where the resources of the wide range of 
external agencies and programs would, in the first instance, be linked and 
coordinated. Pearson has suggested that it could be a statutory body (2000b: 70–
1).4 Its relationship to the existing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC) Regional Council is unclear; ATSIC’s role in Pearson’s 
scheme appears to be confined to the provision of resources. Nor is the 
relationship of the proposed interface to proposals for a statutory ‘Regional 
Authority’ immediately obvious, since Pearson suggests that the interface would 
not itself be a bureaucracy. Rather, while it would be established under statute, it 
would be the formal meeting point at which government and Cape York Aboriginal 
people, through their representatives, negotiated policy development and 
implementation. Government agencies might continue to deliver programs, but 
through negotiated and mutually agreed mechanisms. Resources and 
responsibility for instituting the principles of ‘mutual obligation’ and ‘reciprocity’ 
would be devolved from this interface organisation to the sub-regional, 
‘community’ and ‘family’ levels, or other appropriate local group levels (Pearson 
2000b: 70–2). 
The key concepts examined 
There are immediate issues to address within these proposed new governance 
constructs: important matters such as the representativeness, effectiveness, and 
the external and internal accountability of the new interface and other 
institutions (see discussion in Martin & Finlayson 1996). Pearson himself 
acknowledges the significance of these issues (2000b: 68), and they have been the 
focus of much of the commentary on the proposed institutional arrangements 
underpinning the Cape York Partnerships which are to be developed between the 
Queensland Government and Aboriginal communities and groups in Cape York.5 
However, this paper does not aim to engage directly with critiques of Pearson’s 
institutional scheme for Cape York. Rather, it focuses on certain aspects of the 
underlying conceptual framework advanced by Pearson. 
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In particular, this paper examines Pearson’s notions of ‘welfare dependency’ and 
‘welfare as poison’, and the proposal that through re-introducing the principle of 
‘reciprocity’, the ‘gammon’ welfare economy can be transformed back to a ‘real’ 
economy. While there are many perspectives from which analyses of these 
concepts could be advanced, this discussion draws on insights offered by 
anthropological accounts of remote and rural Aboriginal societies. The aim, 
prefigured here, is to argue that at the heart of Pearson’s proposals lies, of 
necessity, a requirement for significant personal and cultural change within Cape 
York Aboriginal societies. Given the increasingly parlous state of these societies, 
this may well be essential and, as Pearson rightly argues, the changes required 
cannot be instituted by the state. A fundamental contradiction therefore arises, 
since it is arguable that some at least of the values which Pearson (and others) 
seek to change have arisen not solely as the result of the ‘passive welfare’ policies 
of the past three decades, but in the complex conjunction between such policies 
and core, pre-existing Aboriginal values and practices (Martin 1993a, 1993b; 
Sutton 2000). 
Dependency as detrimental 
Pearson is clear in his view as to why Aboriginal participation in the current 
welfare economy is problematic: 
The problem with the welfare economy is that it is not a real economy. It is a 
completely artificial means of living. Our traditional economy was and is a real 
economy. Central to the traditional economy was the imperative for able-
bodied people to work. If you did not hunt and gather, you starved … 
Common to the real economy of traditional society and the real economy of 
the market is the demand for economic and social reciprocity. This reciprocity 
is expressed through work, initiative, struggle, enterprise, contribution, effort. 
The key problem with welfare is that it inherently does not demand 
reciprocity. I call it a gammon economy (1999a: 32; see also Pearson 2000b: 
26–31). 
Concerns about the effectiveness or otherwise of welfare programs, about their 
long term effects on recipients, and about whether they may in some instances 
actually exacerbate the problems they ostensibly seek to address, have been the 
subject of much debate within Australia and internationally (see Saunders 1994: 
1–13; and contributors in Saunders 2000).6 However, it can not be assumed that 
the pejorative view of dependency advanced in the welfare debate, grounded as it 
is, in no small part, on an ideological construct of the moral worth of the 
productive individual within the market economy, is necessarily shared by all 
Aboriginal people. 
On the contrary, there is a significant body of anthropological writing which 
suggests that ‘dependency’, in terms of a culturally established and validated 
capacity to demand and receive resources and services (symbolic and tangible) 
from others, is a core principle through which Aboriginal agency is realised in the 
structuring of social relationships. This principle operates both within 
contemporary Aboriginal groups and in the intercultural zone between them and 
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the wider society (see discussions in Anderson 1983, 1988a; Finlayson 1991; 
Martin 1993b, 1995; Myers 1986; Peterson 1993; Sansom 1980, 1988; Schwab 
1995; Trigger 1992). Objective disparities in power and wealth can be transformed 
by Aboriginal agency through a process of co-opting others, often outsiders 
(including non-Aboriginal people) to become patrons or ‘bosses’. Dependency, 
then, produces a paradox when it becomes a principle of action in the 
intercultural zone. For within the Aboriginal cultural logic, ‘dependency’ may 
establish a position of strength in which the capacity to commandeer another’s 
resources serves to reduce the threat of personal accumulation by others 
(Finlayson 1991; Martin 1993b; Schwab 1995). 
For example, Finlayson’s ethnography of a north Queensland community 
demonstrated how Aboriginal men were able to subvert the potential for women to 
achieve a degree of financial independence through their relatively higher welfare 
incomes. By drawing on culturally specific constructions of gender relations, such 
as women’s obligation to nurture and support their menfolk, men were able to 
gain access to women’s resources for purposes such as purchasing alcohol. They 
achieved this through exercising a particular form of power through dependence 
(Finlayson 1989, 1991). Such values and practices militate against the exercise of 
the reciprocity and personal responsibility Pearson argues are necessary within a 
‘real’ economy. 
It is arguable that, historically, the ability of Aboriginal people to survive the 
impoverishment caused by their social, economic, and political exclusion was 
bolstered by such mechanisms for the distribution of scarce resources (see e.g. 
Collmann 1979, 1988; see also Pearson 2000c: 142–3). It is also arguable that 
Aboriginal people’s ability to negotiate at least some degree of control of certain 
aspects of their lives since colonisation, despite their structurally marginal 
position, has in part turned on their capacity to accommodate and incorporate 
outsiders through such particular cultural constructions of social relations 
(Anderson 1988a; Finlayson 1991). This incorporation reflects and reproduces a 
perhaps universal feature of Aboriginal societies: social forms and relations are 
created and recreated in a direct and immediate fashion through the interactions 
between persons, rather than mediated through objective institutions as is the 
case in larger scale and more hierarchical societies (Bourdieu 1977: 96). 
A difficult analytical—and political—question is raised here, as to whether such 
values and practices should be seen as primarily an adaptive response by 
Aboriginal people to the objective reality of their impoverished and marginalised 
circumstances, or whether they have their ultimate origins within Aboriginal 
cultural traditions themselves. It is suggested here that answers to this complex 
question must take account of both sets of factors. That is, particular Aboriginal 
values and practices, especially those pertaining to social relations, have 
historically facilitated Aboriginal people’s capacity to engage with, and maintain a 
degree of autonomy within, the overwhelmingly dominant society. These 
distinctive values and practices have impacted upon the nature of the historical 
interaction between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies. But they have also 
been changed by this interaction.7 
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Welfare payments as ‘poison’ 
Pearson’s image of welfare incomes as the contemporary equivalent of the poison-
laced flour of the early settlers is a compelling one. As he notes (2000b: 37–9, 
2000c: 150), the period since the introduction of welfare payments over the past 
three decades has corresponded with a deepening crisis within many Aboriginal 
groups and communities, particularly those in remote and rural regions.  
Pearson is undoubtedly correct in implicating welfare payments in the deepening 
social crisis that confronts the Aboriginal people of Cape York and many other 
regions. Previous work by such anthropologists as Finlayson (1991), Martin 
(1993b, 1995), and Schwab (1995) suggests that cash has become deeply 
implicated in the production and reproduction of the distinctive contemporary 
Aboriginal values and practices that lie at the heart of the issues raised by 
Pearson. In the wider market economy, money serves to objectify and 
depersonalise human relations and transactions, but within the Aboriginal 
economy, this capacity of money to abstract individuals from personalised 
relations is typically subverted. Money has become central to a particular kind of 
Aboriginal ‘performative sociality’, in which social relations (notably, those of 
kinship) are constantly produced and reproduced through the flows of services 
and material items between individuals (Martin 1993b, 1995). 
However, just as the role and meaning of money are transformed within the 
Aboriginal economy by particular Aboriginal values and practices, so too has 
money impacted on these values and practices. With the advent of the welfare-
based cash economy, access to resources is no longer mediated through a system 
of personalised relationships within the Aboriginal realm, but is predicated upon 
a person’s rights as a citizen of the wider state, as defined by their particular 
status or category. Aboriginal people are thus increasingly able to assert their 
independence from others within their significant social networks—men from 
responsibilities towards their domestic units, wives from their spouses and 
children, younger men from older people—through the means which cash offers. 
Martin’s analysis (1993b, 1998) of expenditures on alcohol in Cape York 
Aboriginal townships demonstrates one particularly problematic outcome of this 
increased capacity for individuals and groups (especially young men) to exercise 
autonomy without reference to their connections to and obligations towards 
others. Recent research on the delivery of welfare services in one north 
Queensland community has referred to the difficulties in ensuring that welfare 
payments are directed to the children for whom they are intended, because of 
such practices as men ‘humbugging’ recipients of Family Allowance or Parenting 
Payments (Finlayson & Auld 1999: 20; Smith 2000: 36–7). 
Cash has certainly played a role in facilitating, or perhaps deepening, the 
tendencies towards certain kinds of collective actions within Aboriginal groups 
(e.g. through enabling collective saving for consumer goods such as vehicles, and 
the financing of large ceremonial gatherings, as well as resourcing drinking and 
gambling circles).8 However, its fundamental role has been to accentuate 
individuation, abstracting people from the particular matrices of responsibilities, 
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rights, and other aspects of the sets of social relations which characterised 
Aboriginal societies. Pearson is thus quite right to focus on the introduction of 
welfare incomes as marking a significant challenge for Aboriginal people in Cape 
York and elsewhere in remote and rural Australia. 
However, the situation is more complex than Pearson’s discussion would suggest. 
First, ‘reciprocity’ provides the linchpin in his moral and political arguments; it is 
said to differentiate ‘real’ economies, including ‘traditional’ Aboriginal ones, from 
the contemporary ‘gammon’ welfare economy (Pearson 2000b: 26–8). Yet, at best, 
this is a gloss on the principles underpinning both ‘traditional’ and contemporary 
Australian Aboriginal economies: ‘reciprocity,’ as Pearson uses it, is a polemical 
rather than an analytical concept. Like the notion that ‘caring and sharing’ was 
fundamental to traditional Aboriginal societies, Pearson’s notion of ‘reciprocity’ 
ignores basic features of all economies, ‘real’ or otherwise—in particular, power, 
hierarchy, and instrumentality (see Macdonald 2000b: 92–101). 
Second, in the Cape York Aboriginal townships, as elsewhere in remote and rural 
Aboriginal Australia, cash flows not just through welfare payments to younger, 
able-bodied individuals (the focus of both Pearson’s arguments and the Federal 
government’s ‘mutual obligation’ initiative) but through Community Development 
Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme incomes, old age and other pensions, and 
wages. Pearson’s argument would suggest that the source of the cash provides a 
moral force which will be manifested in the way in which it is used by individuals; 
this is a version of ‘you value the things that you work for’ (Pearson 2000b: 23). 
There appears to be little published evidence to support this view (although see 
Macdonald 2000b: 104), and the anecdotal evidence in at least some Cape York 
communities suggests that it is not so much the source of income for the 
individual which determines, for example, how much he or she spends on alcohol, 
but rather the complex interaction between individuals’ values and practices, 
those of their significant social networks, and those of the community in which 
they live (see Brady 1992 regarding petrol sniffing in central Australia, and Martin 
1998 on alcohol consumption in Cape York). Even within Cape York, there are 
marked differences in the incidences and types of social pathology to which 
Pearson refers between and within communities—differences which cannot be 
solely attributed to differences in their welfare economies. 
The relationship between access to welfare-based cash incomes and the 
manifestations of social pathology of which Pearson writes is very complex. 
Pearson seems to suggest that the relationship is causal, arguing that 
contemporary social problems arose directly out of the economic condition of 
passive welfare dependence: 
Of course racism, dispossession and trauma are the ultimate explanations for 
our precarious situation as a people. But the point is: they do not explain our 
recent, rapid and almost total social breakdown. And most importantly: if we 
build our ideology and base our plan of action on our justified bitterness 
about what has happened to us we won’t be able to claim our place in the 
modern economy, because our current social dysfunction is caused by the 
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artificial economy of our communities and by the corrupting nature of passive 
welfare (2000b: 38). 
Pearson argues that the contemporary social problems faced by Cape York 
Aboriginal people are unprecedented in their scale, despite vastly improved 
material circumstances, and contrasts the current situation with that obtaining 
before the 1970s. Aboriginal people lived in great poverty prior to the introduction 
of welfare, Pearson suggests, but their societies, while under sustained attack, 
were ‘strong, if bruised’ (2000b: 39). Yet, the social devastation of which Pearson 
writes so compellingly is not in fact unprecedented, in Cape York or elsewhere. 
Historical accounts of life for Aboriginal people on the fringes of mining camps 
and pastoral stations, and along the northern coasts of the Cape as the result of 
depredation by trochus shell fishermen, demonstrate that in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries Aboriginal societies in many parts of the region 
were under severe pressure (Chase 1980; Evans, Saunders & Cronin 1993; Kidd 
1997; Loos 1982; Rowley 1983). 
It was, precisely, the concern demonstrated in the southern cities about the 
appalling circumstances to which Aboriginal people had been reduced that led to 
the passage of The Protection of Aborigines and Prevention of the Sale of Opium Act 
1897, the establishment of the missions in Cape York, and more generally to the 
regime of authoritarian supervision and control of Aboriginal people’s lives by 
State officials and their missionary delegates under successive statutes. Such 
controls were only finally formally removed with the repeal of the Aborigines Act 
1971 (Qld) in 1984. 
Furthermore, while the issue of social order in the Cape York communities is 
clearly a major concern both for their Aboriginal residents and for government, it 
is not a new issue (although its scale may be different). The maintenance of order 
within settlement populations was a major preoccupation of State and mission 
authorities long before the introduction of welfare payments (MacKenzie 1981; 
Rowley 1983). Arguably, problems arose not just from hostility to the mission or 
settlement authorities, but from the fact that the settlement populations 
comprised, then as they do now, disparate Aboriginal groups forced into often 
uneasy co-residence in close social and geographic proximity to each other, with 
little capacity to resolve conflict by moving away. These settlement situations 
directly confronted such widely reported Aboriginal values as the strong emphasis 
on immediate kin group loyalties and a preference for direct confrontation, and 
often violence, to redress perceived wrongs (see e.g. McKnight 1986; Martin 
1993b). Indigenous authority structures and conflict resolution mechanisms, 
including those within kin groups, were eroded or suppressed under the mission 
and State settlement regimes. This process has been dramatically exacerbated in 
contemporary times, when the authoritarian regimes of the missionaries and 
superintendents are no longer possible nor desirable. Indigenous organisations 
(such as community councils) lack the requisite legitimacy, both alcohol and the 
cash to purchase it are freely available, and Aboriginal authority structures have 
become further contested and attenuated.  
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The period up to the 1970s to which Pearson refers—of ‘strong, if bruised’ 
Aboriginal societies in Cape York—thus preceded not only the introduction of 
welfare payments to Aboriginal people, but  also the removal of many of the more 
direct controls over Aboriginal people’s lives which had been exercised by 
settlement superintendents and local police sergeants. It also preceded the 
increasing availability of alcohol in the previously dry Aboriginal communities. 
Kidd (1997: 302–3) notes that there is little doubt that the legal availability of 
alcohol after 1971 led to considerable turmoil in these communities, and that this 
was compounded by the illicit sale of alcohol including fortified wine and spirits—
the so-called ‘sly grog’ trade.  
As Pearson recognises (2000c: 141), the late 1960s and early 1970s was the 
period of the relocation of significant numbers of Aboriginal people in Cape York 
and elsewhere in northern Australia from pastoral properties to the fringes of 
country towns and to the missions and government reserves and settlements 
(Sutton 2000). This followed the introduction of award wages for Aboriginal 
employees, progressive mechanisation which led to a drop in the demand for 
labour, and the virtual collapse of the pastoral industry with its increasing 
exposure to the demands of international competition.  
Cape York Aboriginal people have thus been exposed over the past three decades 
to a plethora of social, political, and economic forces of quite profound 
significance, and not just to the introduction of welfare payments. Pearson is 
undoubtedly correct in his view that there is evidence of increasing social 
pathology in the Cape York communities. This paper has argued, however, that 
he is not correct in positing access to welfare incomes for Aboriginal people as 
contributing to this social breakdown in a direct and causal sense. His primary 
focus on the economic factors underlying social change (both as disintegration 
and as regeneration) leads Pearson to largely ignore other areas amenable to 
policy changes. For instance, while he devotes some attention in his writings to 
the impact of alcohol on Cape York Aboriginal societies (e.g. 2000b: 16–20; 
2000a), his focus on reforming the delivery of welfare leads him to underestimate 
how deeply alcohol is implicated in the production and reproduction of the 
problems he has identified. It also leads him to ignore potential avenues for 
addressing a crucial structural issue in the facilitation of social change—the 
supply of alcohol through the canteens controlled by the Cape York community 
councils (Martin 1998). 
‘Reciprocity’ and ‘mutual obligation’ 
Pearson’s scheme gives considerable weight to mechanisms for instituting what 
he terms the principle of ‘reciprocity’ as a core means by which the ‘gammon’ 
welfare economy is to be transformed to a ‘real’ economy. It is this suggestion, 
above many others in his proposals, that has been taken up approvingly by a 
range of social and political commentators (e.g. Koch 1999). This is in no small 
part because the concept seems to resonate strongly with the principle of ‘mutual 
obligation’, which has such currency in Australia, and which also pervades policy 
thinking on welfare issues in other countries such as the UK and USA. However, 
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there are important differences between Pearson’s concept of ‘reciprocity’ and the 
political and policy principle of ‘mutual obligation’ as it is currently articulated by 
government. 
The stated objective of mutual obligation is to encourage greater self reliance and 
motivation in job seekers by encouraging them to take responsibility for, and to 
be more focused on, preparing for and searching for work. Under ‘mutual 
obligation’, in return for the provision of welfare (an obligation of the state to 
support individuals who cannot find paid work) the individual has an obligation 
towards the taxpayer, mediated through the state. For instance, a core objective 
of the Federal government’s Mutual Obligation Initiative, which includes the Work 
for the Dole scheme, is to ensure that younger unemployed people undertake 
economic or community activity in return for their support by the taxpayer 
(Newman 1999). The summary statement of ‘Mutual Obligation’ by the 
Department of Employment, Work Relations and Small Business (DEWRSB) is 
that:  
[m]utual obligation is based on a simple proposition—unemployed job seekers 
supported financially by the community should: 
• actively seek work; 
• constantly strive to improve their competitiveness in the labour market; and 
• give something back to the community that supports them.9 
Mutual obligation is thus held to obtain essentially between the individual, as an 
autonomous actor, and the state, representing an undifferentiated ‘community’. 
Furthermore, while the McClure Report (McClure 2000) takes a rather broader 
view of ‘mutual obligation’, current government policy is clearly focused on 
moving individuals from welfare dependency to engagement with the formal 
market economy. As such, the government view of ‘mutual obligation’ is 
consistent with the increasing reliance upon market and quasi-market forces in 
areas of social as well as of economic policy (George & Miller 1994, cited in 
Macdonald 2000a). It is also consistent with a view of the individual as being 
abstracted from particular networks and communities and from a commitment to 
particular values and locales. Rather, people are to take their place as individuals 
in an increasingly mobile workforce within a globalised economic order. 
However, as Pearson articulates it, ‘reciprocity’ does not obtain between the 
Indigenous individual and an undifferentiated, taxpaying Australian ‘community’ 
mediated by the state. Pearson argues in part that the state is too remote from its 
citizens, and furthermore does not have the moral authority with Indigenous 
people to appropriately undertake this role. Rather, ‘mutual obligation’ must be 
demanded and implemented between the individual and his or her particular 
community, family and local group (Pearson 2000b: 85–7). It will be argued in the 
next section that there are likely to be considerable practical difficulties in 
establishing such reciprocity and mutual responsibilities. 
Furthermore, while Pearson accepts the need for engagement of Aboriginal people 
with the market economy through, for example, enterprise development, he also 
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accepts that factors such as locational disadvantage make formal economic 
independence an unrealistic goal, in the short term at least (2000b: 54–5). 
Transfer payments from the state will therefore continue to be required, for 
individuals and for their communities. Rather than arguing that individuals 
should move into the mainstream economy, Pearson argues that welfare provides 
potentially valuable resources for the development of Aboriginal communities, but 
that systemic changes are required in the way in which these welfare resources 
are directed to Indigenous people, if their ‘poison’ is to be leached out. This focus 
on the potential of welfare resources for community development rather than on 
interim individual economic support therefore marks a further substantive 
departure from the current principles of ‘mainstream’ mutual obligation.10 
A further significant difference between ‘mutual obligation’ and Pearson’s compact 
which is yet to be fully explored, or perhaps even clearly identified, by government 
proponents of his scheme is the notion that the demand for individual 
responsibility must come from the individual’s community, family or local group. 
Pearson’s address to the Brisbane Institute in July 1999 laid out his 
interpretation of the community–individual relationship. He stated: 
When we think of reciprocity at its most simple level, the community needs to 
ensure that if there is an income support program that has been provided for 
a specific purpose, say for the well-being of children, then it should be the 
children that benefit from these resources. Ensuring that welfare resources 
are used for the purposes for which they are provided is the least reciprocity 
that needs to be implemented … Communities in Cape York need to be given 
the responsibility to implement reciprocity and responsibility amongst its [sic] 
members. What this all means is that the State must see itself as a partner, 
and, at the most, a junior one. The State must cease to see itself as the sole 
service provider, particularly when it comes to social policy. The objectives of 
the State, to resolve social problems, will not be achieved without effective 
community engagement. If it is to enable communities and individuals, it 
must understand that good policy ideas and initiatives can be generated 
within the community. Not all good policy ideas come from the State (1999a: 
35; see also Pearson 2000b: 84–7). 
Again, this paper supports Pearson’s general propositions, that attempts by the 
state to institute social change may be counterproductive and that it is crucial to 
engage those directly affected. However, the difficulties in actually implementing 
the reciprocity he is seeking can not be underestimated, for Pearson is dealing 
with groups in which Indigenous authority structures are often diffuse, fractured, 
and highly contested, and where attempts by others—whether outsiders or 
members of the individual’s own kin group or ‘community’—to change their 
chosen course of action are generally strenuously resisted. This issue will be 
discussed further in the next section. 
‘Community’ and ‘family’ as units of moral authority 
Pearson wishes to sever the direct connection between the welfare state and the 
Aboriginal individual, by establishing new governance structures, including an 
‘interface’ institution through which broad policy development and program 
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delivery would be negotiated (2000b: 67–73). However, power is to be devolved to, 
and program implementation is to take place at the sub-regional, ‘community’, or 
‘family’ levels, as appropriate. In particular, as discussed above, reciprocity or 
mutual obligation is to be implemented between the individual and his or her 
‘family’, local group, and ‘community’. This reciprocity is to be instituted not 
solely in terms of the individual providing some return to his or her community or 
family (for example, through socially useful labour), but also through ensuring 
that individuals allocate expenditure of their incomes in accordance with the 
purposes for which they are received, as the quote above from Pearson’s 1999 
speech makes clear. He is thus assuming that the ‘community’ and the ‘family’ 
are units of both moral and political authority as well as of the distribution and 
consumption of resources. 
Pearson devotes surprisingly little space to the conceptualisation of what 
constitutes the ‘community’ or for that matter the ‘family’ in the Aboriginal 
context. There is little to differentiate his use of these terms from their use within 
past and current bureaucratic thinking. For example, it appears that what 
Pearson means by ‘community’ corresponds, geographically at least, with the 
discrete settlements in Cape York which for the most part derive from the original 
missions and government settlements. The requirement that Aboriginal people 
develop a sense of community, and notions of community which ignore the 
realities of Aboriginal values and practices, have been a feature of bureaucratic 
thinking and have underpinned self-determination policies since the 1970s 
(Cowlishaw 1998: 150, 1999: 16, 22–3). 
In fact, like all collectivities, but in particular ways, these Aboriginal residential 
communities are highly complex and internally differentiated. They exist as 
communities of interest, if at all, largely in relation to the outside world. The 
sense of loyalty and commitment to such communities required by policy makers 
is at odds with Indigenous traditions (Cowlishaw 1998: 160). Their populations 
are internally differentiated in terms of the factors which continue to inform 
Aboriginal political, social and economic relations, such as affiliations with 
ancestral lands and language, personal and group histories, ethnicity, and 
bearing on all of these, kin group and other local group affiliations. Few if any 
Indigenous community-wide political institutions exist, apart from the quasi-local 
government community councils instituted under State legislation, and regional 
bodies such as the Cape York Land Council and Balkanu Cape York Development 
Corporation (Martin 1997). 
Despite a legislative responsibility for the general peace, welfare and health of 
community residents, the community councils have neither the political nor the 
moral authority to institute the kinds of responsibility and reciprocity for which 
Pearson is arguing. This can be seen most clearly in the inability of any of these 
councils to deal with the problems directly arising from the extraordinarily high 
consumption of alcohol from the canteens they control (Martin 1998). In 
Aurukun, an attempt to institute mechanisms by which a statutory ‘Alcohol Law 
Council’, comprised of a broadly representative group of nominally authoritative 
individuals, could control the consumption of alcohol has been largely 
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unsuccessful. This failure has arguably resulted in part from a lack of effective 
institutional support, but also through the reluctance of people to intervene in the 
behaviour of others, unless their own interests are directly affected. 
Aboriginal societies in Cape York, as throughout much of Aboriginal Australia, 
are characterised by an intense ‘localism’, in which primacy is accorded to 
relations, values and interests grounded in the particular and local, rather than 
in the broader and more general (Martin 1997). Core constitutive elements of 
these societies are indeed the ‘families’ of which Pearson writes. These are 
structured by principles of kinship and descent, and may live across a number of 
households within a community or even dispersed across communities. These 
‘families of polity’ (Sutton 1998: 55ff.) are not to be understood as merely the 
Aboriginal equivalents of the extended families of the non-Indigenous domain, but 
as playing a central role in defining and organising social, economic and political 
relations (Mantziaris & Martin 2000: 169–70; Sutton 1998). 
Nonetheless, while ‘families’ may constitute basic units for the coordination of 
certain forms of social and political action (for example in disputation and 
fighting; see Martin 1993b), they are typically highly internally differentiated and 
often deeply factionalised. Kinship may provide the idiom in which relations of 
amity and mutual support are expressed, but it also provides points of fracture 
and differentiation (Mantziaris & Martin 2000: 282–3; Sutton 1999: 56–7). Sibling 
rivalry, for example, is one of the dynamic principles underlying traditional ritual 
and land tenure in western Cape York societies, and it is also manifested in 
contemporary political structures and processes. 
‘Families’ and other such local groups cannot be seen as clearly bounded entities, 
with unambiguously defined memberships. Within families and households, the 
autonomy of individuals is typically jealously preserved, and attempts by others 
to control behaviour strenuously resisted. Even children assert considerable 
autonomy, for example in refusing to attend school, and in demanding cash from 
other family members (Finlayson 1991; Martin 1993b). Such practices arguably 
reflect continuities in child-rearing practices as much as they do social 
breakdown (Sutton 2000). It is rare for even a senior individual to be able to 
exercise authority across all members of a family, particularly in relation to the 
matters about which Pearson is most concerned—expenditure of individual 
incomes, care of children, consumption of alcohol, and so forth. On the contrary, 
it is more often the young men who succeed in demanding the resources of 
others, and whose drinking is often beyond the capacity of others to curtail, and 
the younger women who are able to leave the care of their children in the hands 
of their mothers and grandmothers (Finlayson 1991; Martin 1993b). 
The difficulties which will confront attempts to draw upon existing authority 
structures within groups such as ‘families’, or wider collectivities, can be clearly 
seen in the native title context. Here, questions of who has authority, over what, 
and in which contexts, have proved to be the subject of significant disputation 
and even some litigation, for example in the matter of who may properly authorise 
a native title application (Mantziaris & Martin 2000: 39–41, 315–7). Identifying 
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individuals who have the authority to act on behalf of others may be problematic 
and attempts to do so produce a pattern of shifting allegiances and disputes. This 
suggests that Pearson’s expectation, that ‘families’ will adopt an instrumental role 
in establishing and demanding reciprocity from individual family members in 
return for their welfare incomes, as well as enforcing responsibility in the 
expenditure of such incomes, is unlikely to be realised.11 
Thus, the practical implementation of mutual responsibility and reciprocity 
between the individual and a broader collectivity, whether this is defined as the 
‘community’ or even the ‘family’, is likely to be beset with difficulties, at the very 
least. At the worst, it has the potential to engender considerable conflict. It may 
be difficult or even impossible for disputes within ‘families’ or communities about 
the implementation of responsibility and reciprocity to be resolved without 
external assistance (Mantziaris & Martin 2000: 315–7). The question of how such 
conflicts might be mediated or arbitrated is one to which Pearson, as yet, appears 
to have given no consideration. But it is one of considerable importance to the 
implementation of his scheme.  
The impetus for social change 
Pearson is clearly arguing for both structural and attitudinal changes in Cape 
York’s Aboriginal societies, and recognises that these two dimensions are linked. 
Transforming the current economy to a ‘real’ economy is a necessary precursor, 
in his view, to transforming corrupted values into real reciprocity and mutual 
obligation. 
This paper has discussed a number of issues for Pearson’s scheme raised by 
anthropological understandings of remote Aboriginal societies, particularly those 
of Cape York. It concludes by focusing briefly on three interrelated questions 
which go to the heart of his scheme. Briefly stated, these are: 
• how is change to be effected when the evidence suggests that certain 
widespread Aboriginal values and practices may be inimical to such change; 
•  where might the necessary moral and political authority to effect such 
change lie; and 
• what are the implications of these factors for the new institutional 
arrangements Pearson argues are required? 
A new moral order 
Underpinning Pearson’s scheme is the institution of a new moral order. 
Structural change is required but the state, he argues, does not have the moral 
authority with Aboriginal people to undertake this. Rather, moral authority, 
exercised through the requirement for ‘reciprocity’, resides with units within 
Aboriginal society—variously the ‘community’, local groups and the ‘family’. 
Pearson’s arguments for a new moral and institutional order reflect his concern 
about the often quite desperate situation in much of remote and rural Aboriginal 
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Australia, including Cape York. Maintaining the status quo is clearly an 
inadequate response, both ethically and politically. In Pearson’s view, the 
necessary changes must be demanded and implemented from within Aboriginal 
societies themselves, although the state can assist by creating the necessary 
structural changes (e.g. at the policy level). Pearson thus inverts the conventional 
rhetoric of Indigenous self determination—which is typically focused on 
maintaining the uniqueness of Indigenous social and political and economic 
forms—and instead harnesses it to a dynamic for social change.  
Pearson’s scheme is ultimately predicated upon a degree of compulsion, albeit 
arising from within the Aboriginal polity. His implicit reliance upon the capacity of 
Indigenous mechanisms operating within various levels of social grouping—
‘family’, ‘local group’, and ‘community’—to demand reciprocity and responsibility 
assumes that certain deeply sedimented values and practices in these troubled 
and fractured societies can be changed from within. Herein lies a paradox. 
It is certainly arguable that a new moral order is required, as part of the 
necessary structural change. But the research discussed in this paper suggests 
that the difficulty in  locating centres of moral authority within contemporary 
Aboriginal societies must not be underestimated. Attempts to institute the 
‘community’, the ‘family,’ or other such social units of Aboriginal society as 
sources of moral authority or suasion for the purposes of implementing welfare 
policy are likely to be ineffectual, or even actively resisted. There is a parallel 
difficulty in locating clear centres of political authority in these essentially 
acephalous societies. 
Pearson himself appears to accept that certain of the values and practices which 
are manifest in dysfunctional Aboriginal societies in Cape York have not simply 
arisen because of the historical processes of exclusion, oppression, alienation and 
consequent trauma. He acknowledges that they also resonate with deeply 
embedded Indigenous principles; thus, for example, he writes of the 
contemporary distortion of the Aboriginal values of reciprocity and sharing 
amongst drinkers (2000b: 18–19). He raises indirectly the difficult question as to 
whether certain core Aboriginal values and practices may inhibit the capacity of 
the Cape York communities to institute the changes that are, in his view, 
necessary. To put it another way, Aboriginal people may actively resist attempts 
to change certain of their core values and practices which are incompatible with 
those of the dominant society. This question is far from a novel one for 
anthropologists (see e.g. Brunton 1993; Cowlishaw 1998; Elkin 1951; Macdonald 
2000b; Stanner 1979; Sutton 2000), but however carefully and sensitively 
discussions of this issue are conducted, there is the potential for them to feed 
into contentious political debates and be portrayed as ‘blaming the victim’. 
Pearson’s response is to reject the appellation of victim, to argue that change is 
required both in Indigenous values and practices and in those of the state, and to 
affirm the capacity of Aboriginal people to institute change. 
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Authorising change 
Given the absence or attenuated nature of legitimate Indigenous authority 
structures in many Aboriginal communities, including those in Cape York (see 
e.g. Martin 1993a, 1993b; Wyvill 1990a, 1990b), it is far from clear how the 
reciprocity and responsibilities of the kind Pearson envisages might actually be 
instituted without active intervention, either by external individuals or 
institutions, or by internal institutions (formal or informal) with the necessary 
moral and political authority. External interventions have a long and problematic 
history, in Cape York and elsewhere, for example in the attempts in missions and 
government settlements to reformulate Aboriginal beliefs and practices to accord 
with those of the external agents of change (e.g. Kidd 1997; for accounts relevant 
to north Queensland see also Anderson 1988b; Chase 1980; Finlayson 1991; 
Martin 1993b). In particular, the demand for reciprocity by an external source of 
moral (and political) authority is far from new; it underpinned the operations of 
many of the missions in Cape York and elsewhere, in which the mission 
administrations variously demanded labour, bush tucker, cleanliness, and 
religious observance in return for protection, food, and housing. 
Pearson rejects such forms of external intervention, and is especially critical of 
the ‘white dictator’ leadership model of which missionaries and government 
superintendents were exemplars (Pearson 2000b: 49). Yet, this paper has 
suggested that it will prove very difficult to locate appropriate and legitimate 
sources of moral and political authority within the existing Indigenous polity of 
Cape York. It has argued that underlying much of the social devastation and 
dysfunction of which Pearson and others have written is a particular conjunction 
between certain features of Cape York’s traditional Indigenous cultures and the 
historical forces to which they have been exposed during and since colonisation. 
These forces include, but are not limited to, the introduction of the welfare system 
on which Pearson focuses. This same conjunction also underlies the marked 
contemporary emphasis on individual rights over personal and collective 
responsibilities, and also the fragmented Indigenous polity with its diffuse and 
contested authority structures. 
This brings us to the fundamental question: if (as Pearson suggests) the state 
does not have the necessary moral authority to institute change, and if (as this 
paper argues) groupings within the Indigenous polity such as ‘families’ and other 
local groups or the residential ‘communities’ and their organisations also do not 
currently have the relevant capacity or authority, then how is change to be 
authorised and implemented? 
A new institutional order 
As an intrinsic component of his proposal for social change in Cape York’s 
Aboriginal communities, Pearson has argued for new institutions at the interface 
between the Indigenous polity and the state, and for power and decision-making 
to be devolved to both formal and informal institutions at the regional, 
community and local levels. Such arrangements should build on existing local 
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and regional organisations and capacities, Pearson argues, rather than 
supplanting or competing with them (2000b: 65–73). It is through these 
institutions that reciprocity and responsibility are to be demanded and 
implemented. 
However, Pearson’s focus on economic factors (welfare) as the primary cause of 
the contemporary malaise and dysfunction within Cape York’s Aboriginal 
communities has led him to give undue emphasis to the role of these proposed 
institutions in controlling and distributing government resources. In particular, 
Pearson has concentrated on the projected role of these institutions in the 
distribution of welfare-based resources in return for socially valuable work or 
other activities, and (more problematically) in monitoring the utilisation of those 
resources by individuals. Pearson has called for a new form of Indigenous 
leadership, which he suggests should be a ‘pervasive’ concept throughout the 
layers of governance (Pearson 2000b: 51–2), a form of what Wolfe (1989) calls 
‘dispersed governance’ (see also Rowse 1992: 88–90). However, Pearson’s 
discussion elides the essentially political nature of the new Indigenous 
institutions that he advocates; political not just in the shift in power relations 
between Indigenous groups and the state that the new partnerships would 
require, but also in the necessity to establish and sustain new dispersed sources 
of authority and power within the Indigenous polity itself (Rowse 1992: 90). 
Fundamental questions are thus raised, not only for Pearson himself but for 
those such as the author of this paper who is in agreement with his call for a 
radical rethinking of the current policy climate. What institutional forms might be 
drawn from, or developed within, the existing Cape York Aboriginal polity in order 
to authorise change? What would be the sources of their moral and political 
authority? How might decisions based on assessments of the collective good be 
implemented in political cultures with a characteristically strong emphasis on 
personal autonomy and individual rights? These are, it is suggested, significant 
issues, for the kinds of structural and attitudinal changes which Pearson seeks 
will not be achieved merely by persuasion and negotiation.12 
While government may not have the moral authority with Aboriginal people to 
effect change, as Pearson suggests, it is arguable that it does have a moral 
responsibility to ensure that principles of social justice, equity, and accountability 
are adhered to in the utilisation of the resources it provides to address Indigenous 
socioeconomic disadvantage.13 This, and the fractured nature of the 
contemporary Indigenous polity, suggest that government may need to be 
involved as ‘partners’ at a far more intimate and hands-on level than Pearson 
envisages, including assisting with the development of new Indigenous 
governance institutions and facilitating capacity-building within those 
institutional arrangements (e.g. through supporting ‘social entrepreneurs’ 
(Pearson 2000b)). The Aurukun Alcohol Law Council, previously discussed, which 
was established under State legislation following intensive community 
consultations, provides an illustration of how new and innovative institutions 
which have an organic basis within the Indigenous polity can founder without 
proactive and intensive external support (Martin 1998). Yet such support and 
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intimate involvement also bring their own inherent risks, since whatever their 
protestations regarding support for self determination, the state and its agents 
are ultimately incapable of divesting themselves of their own political and cultural 
baggage (Cowlishaw 1998: 145; Macdonald 2000a: 10–12). 
Conclusion: Is welfare dependency ‘welfare poison’? 
Pearson has argued strongly that profound social and political and economic 
change are necessary in Cape York Aboriginal communities, and has been willing 
to confront difficult and contentious issues. This paper supports his contention 
that the dysfunction in these communities is of such a magnitude that 
maintaining the policy status quo is simply not an option. It is also supportive of 
his argument that structural and attitudinal changes are necessarily interlinked, 
and that policy should be directed at both levels.  
However, Pearson’s argument for an essentially mono-causal connection between 
the introduction of the welfare system and increasing social dysfunction ignores 
the impact of a whole range of factors since colonisation began. The issues raised 
by Pearson go to the heart of the relationship between contemporary Indigenous 
groups and the modern state; they do not just concern the impact of the welfare-
based cash economy. The problems faced by Cape York Aboriginal people 
therefore cannot be seen as arising just from ‘welfare poison’. Rather, they derive 
from a ‘toxic cocktail’ of ingredients (Pearson 2000a), including some that may 
ultimately originate within the Aboriginal realm itself. Pearson is right to call for a 
reform of Indigenous governance as a fundamental component of the wider 
reforms he seeks, but his focus on welfare as the primary cause of the problems 
within Cape York’s Aboriginal communities has led him to underestimate the 
significant internal political dimensions of the necessary institutional changes. 
 
Notes 
1.  A related point was made by Tim Rowse, as discussant in response to a presentation 
of an earlier draft of this paper at a seminar at the Centre for Aboriginal Economic 
Policy Research, The Australian National University, June 21, 2000. 
2.  Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, ‘Mutual 
Obligation and the new Preparing for Work Agreement’, 1st February, 2001. 
Fact sheet available at http://www.dewrsb.gov.au/department/budget/factsheets/ 
mutal_obligation.htm. 
3.  Currently (February 2001), those on full unemployment benefits who may be required 
to participate in Work for the Dole are 18 to 19 year-old school leavers who have been 
receiving Youth Allowance as a job seeker for three months, 18 to 24 year-old job 
seekers who have been receiving Youth Allowance for six months or more, and 25 to 
34 year-old job seekers who have been receiving Youth Allowance for 12 months or 
more. As well, people who are 18 years old or more and receiving the full rate of 
Newstart Allowance or Youth Allowance may volunteer to participate in Work for the 
Dole (http://www.dewrsb.gov.au/wfd/mutual_obligation/MO_Q&A.asp). 
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4.  Pearson’s proposal for a statutory interface organisation to co-ordinate policy 
development and program delivery for Indigenous people, shares some structural and 
conceptual similarities with the recommendation of the Reeves Review of the 
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) for a Northern Territory 
Aboriginal Council to act as the formal partnership interface between Regional Land 
Councils and government (Reeves 1998). 
5.  For a Queensland government response to Pearson’s proposals, see ‘Cape York 
Partnerships: Some practical ideas’ (Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 
Brisbane, 2000), available at http://www.premiers.qld.gov.au/about/pcd/cape.pdf. 
6.  The author of Saunders (1994) is Peter Saunders, of the Social Policy Research Centre 
at the University of New South Wales. The editor of Saunders (2000) is also named 
Peter Saunders, but was (then) of the Australian Institute of Family Studies in 
Melbourne. 
7.  For example, see the discussion of this mutual implication of ‘structural’ and ‘cultural’ 
factors in the development of Aboriginal drinking patterns in Martin (1998). 
8.  I am indebted to Francesca Merlan (pers. comm.) for this observation.  
9.  A summary of the current principles of mutual obligation as enunciated by the 
government can be found at the DEWRSB website, at: http://www.dewrsb.gov.au/ 
wfd/mutual_obligation/MO_Q&A.asp. 
10. Although the McClure Report itself (McClure 2000; see also Lyons 2000) argues for a 
commitment by all levels of government, as well as by business and the non-profit 
sector, to community capacity building and community economic development, this is 
not as yet reflected in government policy. 
11. This is not to say that ‘families’ can not form appropriate groupings through which, 
for example, mechanisms for establishing more collective savings and expenditure 
goals might be negotiated, as in the ‘Family Income Management’ projects which are 
currently being trialed in a number of Cape York communities. However, such 
necessarily voluntary schemes typically require the intensive assistance of outsiders 
(such as the social entrepreneurs of which Pearson writes), and are vulnerable to 
instrumental action by individuals refusing to have their own autonomy curtailed. 
Structural factors, such as the availability of banking or credit facilities, are critical to 
the success of these projects, not least because they can short-circuit the demands 
from kin for access to cash incomes. 
12. More broadly, the issue of moral suasion, or perhaps even coercion, in instituting 
cultural and social change, even if arguably for the common good, also raises the 
matter of basic citizenship entitlements in a modern democratic state, an issue to 
which Cape York Aboriginal people are highly attuned. 
13. Peter Sutton (pers. comm.) brought to my attention this argument for differentiating 
the (possible lack of) moral authority of the state on the one hand, and its moral 
responsibility to act for the common good on the other. 
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